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ABSTRACT: This paper responds to William Scheuerman's analysis of Edward Snowden as someone whose acts fit within John Rawls's account of civil disobedience understood as a public, non-violent, conscientious breach of law performed with overall fidelity to law and a willingness to accept punishment. This paper rejects the narrow Rawlsian notion in favour of a broader notion of civil disobedience understood as a constrained, conscientious and communicative breach of law that demonstrates opposition to law or policy and a desire for lasting change. The paper shows that, according to Rawls's unduly narrow conception, Edward Snowden is not a civil disobedient. But, according to the more plausible, broader conception, he is. The paper then identifies some advantages of the broader conception in contemporary analyses of new forms of disobedience including globalised disobedience and digital disobedience.
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Edward Snowden, the former CIA systems administrator who leaked information about classified NSA programs to the Guardian and Washington Post, qualifies as a civil disobedient, but not in the well-known, narrow, and implausible sense articulated by John Rawls.
Rawls defines civil disobedience as a 'public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to the law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.' 1 More specifically, civil disobedience is:
…disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law, although it is at the outer edge thereof. The law is broken, but fidelity to law is expressed by the public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one's act. reasons for informing the public about NSA programs, namely, that the public should be able to make an informed decision about these programs, the parameters of privacy, and how society will be governed. Snowden's behaviour aligns with Joseph Raz's requirement that a civilly disobedient act, even if it is unannounced and initially covert, be followed up afterward by an acknowledgement of the act and the reasons for which it is taken.
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Next, there is Rawls's fidelity to law condition, which is as demanding as his publicity condition is given its requirement that one be willing to accept the legal consequences for one's act.
In Snowden's case, some US officials claim that his acts were treasonous. If that were so, then, by nature, they would lack fidelity to the law of the United States regardless of whether Snowden were willing to pay the legal price, and Snowden would be in good company with Mahatma Gandhi as someone whose acts of civil disobedience sit outside the conceptual space offered by Rawls.
More importantly, though, Snowden signalled his unwillingness to accept the legal consequences for his conduct by fleeing to Hong Kong and then to Russia in an attempt ultimately to seek asylum in Latin America (or, indeed, in any one of the 21 countries to which he reportedly appealed).
Scheuerman argues that, despite Snowden's efforts to circumvent prosecution, he does display fidelity to law. Scheuerman stresses Snowden's implicit appeal to legal arguments in his discussion of the appropriate sanctions for disobedients as well as his awareness that, most likely, he would not receive a fair trial in the US.
Scheuerman observes that 'A disobedient who accepts the legitimacy of criminal proceedings which are secret, irregular, arbitrary, or unduly brutal does not, in fact, necessarily uphold legality. On the contrary, by participating in them he risks becoming complicit in the regime's attack on the rule of law.'
There are two lines of reply that need to be made here. The first concerns Snowden and Rawls on fidelity. The second concerns Scheuerman's take on the rule of law.
Concerning Snowden, the fact that any trial would most likely be conducted in secret and would not be fair is irrelevant to the condition that a civil disobedient be willing to accept the legal consequences. Moreover, the fact that Snowden invokes Furthermore, regardless of problems of transplantation, Rawls's fidelity to law condition can be questioned since neither willingness nor unwillingness to accept the legal consequences need be a mark of a certain attitude toward the law. Willingness to accept the legal consequences for disobedience is not necessarily a mark of fidelity to law because a disobedient can have other reasons for accepting the legal consequences; for example, doing so may be strategically useful. 7 Conversely, unwillingness to accept the legal consequences is not necessarily evidence of a lack of fidelity to law because the punishment for an offence may be the very thing that the disobedient opposes and which she seeks to highlight by breaching the law in question.
his disclosures and his self-exposure, he showed that he was willing to bear the risk of being punished as well as to endure the substantial losses of his citizenship rights and residence rights in the US.
In short, Snowden's conduct aligns with a broader, less tendentious, and more credible conception of civil disobedience that Rawls's. This broader conception sees civil disobedience as a constrained, conscientious and communicative breach of law that demonstrates one's opposition to a law or policy and one's desire for lasting change.
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Putting Snowden aside for the moment, let's turn to Scheuerman's claim that it is indispensible to understanding and defining civil disobedience that it display a principled commitment to legality, which can mean amongst other things not accepting the legitimacy of criminal proceedings that are secret, irregular, arbitrary, or unduly brutal. To participate in them could make a disobedient, like Snowden, complicit in the regime's attack on the rule of law.
Scheuerman relies on a content-laden notion of rule of law that '…provide[s]
protections against arbitrary as well as unjust state action.' To my mind, this is closer to the rule of justice than the rule of law. My own take on the rule of law is less idealistic and less optimistic.
I agree with Scheuerman that the rule of law protects against (certain kinds of) arbitrariness, namely, the arbitrariness of the unpredictable, particularist variety that targets individual people without warning. As such, rule of law can protect against some unjust state actions, i.e. formal or procedure injustices that violate norms of generality, relative proportionality, and predictability. But since the legality of law does not depend on the morality of law, the rule of such law need not, though of course can, protect against substantive injustices, such as those to be visited upon whistle-blowers who are charged and convicted under the US Espionage Act.
It is unlikely that we will make progress by debating the meaning of the term 'rule of law'. 10 Therefore, instead, I will note the advantages of an account of civil disobedience that does not build in either fidelity to the law of a given system or fidelity to a substantive, justice-laden notion of rule of law. course, she may be arrested and may be punished, but she is not a member of the community to whose sense of justice a Rawlsian disobedient would necessarily appeal.) The narrow, Rawlsian approach is less applicable than contemporary accounts are to the globalized world in which we live, as it can say nothing about the myriad of new forms of civil disobedience such as international, transnational, and cyber disobedience.
Returning once more to Edward Snowden, his acts are not only civilly disobedient, they are morally justified. He was properly sensitive to the responsibility that public officials have to exercise first-order moral reasoning about the programs they oversee. He was willing to put that moral responsibility ahead of formal expectations even though it was personally costly and meant breaking the law. It is true that he defended his acts in part on the political ground that the public has a right to be informed about policies that lack judicial and congressional oversight. But, behind that argument lies the moral argument that personal privacy is a fundamentally important interest which we should not allow our policies to erode without our informed consideration.
